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  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-id journal-id-type="nlm-ta">REA Press</journal-id>
      <journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">20</journal-id>
      <journal-title>REA Press</journal-title><issn pub-type="ppub">3042-0210</issn><issn pub-type="epub">3042-0210</issn><publisher>
      	<publisher-name>REA Press</publisher-name>
      </publisher>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <article-id pub-id-type="doi">https://doi.org/10.22105/aaa.v1i3.44</article-id>
      <article-categories>
        <subj-group subj-group-type="heading">
          <subject>Research Article</subject>
        </subj-group>
        <subj-group><subject>Financial leverage, Firm performance, Corporate efficiency, Cash holding</subject></subj-group>
      </article-categories>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Financial Leverage and Firm Performance: The Moderating Role of Cash Holdings</article-title><subtitle>Financial Leverage and Firm Performance: The Moderating Role of Cash Holdings</subtitle></title-group>
      <contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author">
	<name name-style="western">
	<surname>Samadi </surname>
		<given-names>Navid </given-names>
	</name>
	<aff>Department of Accounting, North Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran.</aff>
	</contrib></contrib-group>		
      <pub-date pub-type="ppub">
        <month>04</month>
        <year>2024</year>
      </pub-date>
      <pub-date pub-type="epub">
        <day>27</day>
        <month>04</month>
        <year>2024</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>1</volume>
      <issue>3</issue>
      <permissions>
        <copyright-statement>© 2024 REA Press</copyright-statement>
        <copyright-year>2024</copyright-year>
        <license license-type="open-access" xlink:href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/"><p>This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.</p></license>
      </permissions>
      <related-article related-article-type="companion" vol="2" page="e235" id="RA1" ext-link-type="pmc">
			<article-title>Financial Leverage and Firm Performance: The Moderating Role of Cash Holdings</article-title>
      </related-article>
	  <abstract abstract-type="toc">
		<p>
			Firms with higher managerial ability are likely to invest more efficiently, especially when they have excess liquidity. Managerial ability is one of the most important determinants of firm efficiency, but regulatory mechanisms complement the effect of intelligent managers on investment efficiency. Capital structure decisions reduce organizational inefficiency by constraining managers' investment behavior. Koussis et al. [1] argue that managers may need to invest more optimally in growth options and lead their firms with high agency costs. High debt financing through asset diversion reduces the inefficiency of the final investment and managers who spend wastefully. The threats posed by managers' inability to meet their debt financing needs are the driving force behind making organizations more effective. Using more debt in the capital structure provides an opportunity to control managers' spending behavior and reduce the problems of overinvestment. However, excessive use of financial leverage increases agency costs and can lead to another type of inefficiency. Therefore, companies need to borrow up to an optimal debt level, called debt capacity. Research has shown that increasing financial leverage, due to the regulatory role of debt, improves firm performance.
		</p>
		</abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
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      <p>nunn</p>
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