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    <journal-meta>
      <journal-id journal-id-type="nlm-ta">REA Press</journal-id>
      <journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">20</journal-id>
      <journal-title>REA Press</journal-title><issn pub-type="ppub">3042-0210</issn><issn pub-type="epub">3042-0210</issn><publisher>
      	<publisher-name>REA Press</publisher-name>
      </publisher>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <article-id pub-id-type="doi">https://doi.org/10.22105/aaa.v2i3.70</article-id>
      <article-categories>
        <subj-group subj-group-type="heading">
          <subject>Research Article</subject>
        </subj-group>
        <subj-group><subject>Board Compensation, CEO Power, Firms’ Innovation, Ownership Structure</subject></subj-group>
      </article-categories>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Investigation of the  Effect of Board Compensation and CEO Power on Firms’ Innovation with the Moderating Role of Ownership Structure</article-title><subtitle>Investigation of the  Effect of Board Compensation and CEO Power on Firms’ Innovation with the Moderating Role of Ownership Structure</subtitle></title-group>
      <contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author">
	<name name-style="western">
	<surname>Ghafourian Shagerdi</surname>
		<given-names>Amir  </given-names>
	</name>
	<aff>Department of Administrative Sciences, Imam Reza International University, Mashhad, Iran.</aff>
	</contrib><contrib contrib-type="author">
	<name name-style="western">
	<surname>Cheragh Sahar</surname>
		<given-names>Leila </given-names>
	</name>
	<aff>Department of Administrative Sciences, Imam Reza International University, Mashhad, Iran.</aff>
	</contrib><contrib contrib-type="author">
	<name name-style="western">
	<surname> Ebrahimi</surname>
		<given-names>Seyyed Kazem</given-names>
	</name>
	<aff>Department of Economics, Management and Administrative Sciences, Semnan University, Semnan, Iran.</aff>
	</contrib></contrib-group>		
      <pub-date pub-type="ppub">
        <month>07</month>
        <year>2025</year>
      </pub-date>
      <pub-date pub-type="epub">
        <day>14</day>
        <month>07</month>
        <year>2025</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>2</volume>
      <issue>3</issue>
      <permissions>
        <copyright-statement>© 2025 REA Press</copyright-statement>
        <copyright-year>2025</copyright-year>
        <license license-type="open-access" xlink:href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/"><p>This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.</p></license>
      </permissions>
      <related-article related-article-type="companion" vol="2" page="e235" id="RA1" ext-link-type="pmc">
			<article-title>Investigation of the  Effect of Board Compensation and CEO Power on Firms’ Innovation with the Moderating Role of Ownership Structure</article-title>
      </related-article>
	  <abstract abstract-type="toc">
		<p>
			The present study examines the effect of board compensation and CEO power on Firms’ innovation with the moderating role of ownership structure based on data envelopment analysis. The statistical population of the study includes all companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange, which after sampling amounted to 143 companies and over a 10-year period from 2012 to 2021. The hypothesis testing method in the present study was the use of multiple ordinary regression using R software. The results of the study show that there is a significant relationship between board compensation and firms’ innovation. There is also a significant relationship between CEO power and  firms’ innovation. Ownership structure does not moderate the relationship between board compensation and  firms’ innovation, and finally, ownership structure does not moderate the relationship between CEO power and  firms’ innovation.
		</p>
		</abstract>
    </article-meta>
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