Top Management Team Stability and the Quality of Interaction with the Independent Auditor

Authors

  • Akram Afsay * Department of Accounting, Farabi Campus, University of Tehran, Qom, Iran. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0551-9197
  • Hassan Shafikhani Department of Accounting, Farabi Campus, University of Tehran, Qom, Iran.

https://doi.org/10.22105/aaa.v2i4.85

Abstract

This article examines the role of senior management team stability in the quality of engagement with the independent auditor and analyzes its importance in promoting professional trust, reducing audit risk, and strengthening professional judgment. Research shows that management stability, by creating mutual understanding and consistent procedures, enables effective interaction and transparent information exchange between management and the auditor. Long-term interactions provide opportunities to improve efficiency and reduce uncertainty, but in the absence of appropriate oversight, they may lead to overreliance and threats to auditor independence. A concentrated ownership structure, institutional interference, and the complexity of the business environment further increase the importance of management stability and oversight frameworks. Concentrated ownership structure, institutional interference, and the complexity of the business environment double the importance of management stability and oversight frameworks. Findings suggest that combining senior management team stability with effective corporate governance mechanisms and internal controls maximizes opportunities for professional engagement with the auditor and minimizes potential threats to it. This article suggests that policymakers and managers should pay special attention to strengthening management stability, maintaining auditor independence, and improving the quality of engagement in order to enhance transparency, investor confidence, and audit effectiveness in Iran.

Keywords:

Senior management team stability, Audit, Effective engagement

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Published

2025-12-23

Issue

Vol. 2 No. 4 (2025): Accounting and Auditing with Applications

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Articles

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How to Cite

Afsay, A. ., & Shafikhani, H. . (2025). Top Management Team Stability and the Quality of Interaction with the Independent Auditor. Accounting and Auditing With Applications , 2(4), 326-337. https://doi.org/10.22105/aaa.v2i4.85